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Abstract
RISC-V is an open-source hardware ISA based on the RISC
design principles, and has been the subject of some novel ROP
mitigation technique proposals due to its open-source nature.
However, very little work has actually evaluated whether such
an attack is feasible assuming a typical RISC-V implemen-
tation. We show that RISC-V ROP can be used to perform
Turing complete calculation and arbitrary function calls by
leveraging gadgets found in a version of the GNU libc library.
Using techniques such as self-modifying ROP chains and
algorithmic ROP chain generation, we demonstrate the power
of RISC-V ROP by creating a compiler that converts code
of arbitrary complexity written in a popular Turing-complete
language into RISC-V ROP chains.
1 Introduction
RISC-V is an open RISC architecture developed at Berke-
ley and backed by an international consortium. Like other
modern architectures, RISC-V has hardware support for data
execution prevention (DEP).
Return-oriented programming, or ROP, is a systematiza-
tion and generalization of code-reuse attack techniques like
return-into-libc [14] and the borrowed-chunks technique [9].
With ROP, short instruction sequences, each ending in a return
instruction, are combined into building blocks called gadgets.
An attacker who controls the stack can induce any desired
functionality by sequencing gadgets, even in the presence of
DEP. ROP was originally described for the x86 [13], and sub-
sequently extended to other architectures such as SPARC [2],
ARM [8], and PowerPC [11].
The RISC-V instruction set was designed for extensibil-
ity, with a substantial portion of the opcode space left unas-
signed [15]. Researchers have taken advantage of RISC-V’s
extensibility to propose hardware extensions that make code-
reuse attacks harder to mount (see, e.g., [4, 5, 7, 10]).
There’s just one problem: No one seems to have shown
that general, Turing-complete ROP is possible on RISC-V.1
In this short note, we close this gap by showing that ROP is,
indeed, possible on RISC-V. We demonstrate how arithmetic,
memory reads and writes, conditional branching, and function
invocation can be performed solely through ROP gadgets
found in the GNU libc library. To work around limitations in
the available instruction sequences, we introduce techniques
for self-modifying ROP chains that may be of independent
interest. As is now traditional (see, e.g., [12]), we show that
our gadget set is Turing complete by designing a compiler
that accepts a Brainfuck program of arbitrary complexity and
generates an equivalent RISC-V ROP chain.
1.1 Experimental Platform
We analyze glibc-2.30.9000-29.fc32.riscv64, runninng on
Fedora-Developer-Rawhide-20200108.n.0 booting on the virt
machine in QEMU. Since we do not leverage any features
of emulated hardware outside of documented ISA, our ROP
chains and gadgets should also work on equivalent hardware.
We target the RV64GC variant of the RISC-V ISA, which
includes the 64-bit base integer instruction set as well as the
MAFDC extensions: integer multiplication/division, atomic
instructions, single- and double-precision floating point, and
compressed instructions.
The C extension would be interesting for analyzing ROP
potential because it allows for some degree of variable-length
instructions. Rather than all instructions being 4 bytes long,
the C extension allows certain commonly-used instructions
to only take up 2 bytes in an effort to reduce code size.
Unlike ARM Thumb mode, the RISC-V C extension does
not require a mode switch, and compressed instructions can
coexist with uncompressed instructions in the same instruc-
tion stream. We will analyze the implications of this optional
but very common extension on ROP gadget availability.
1In independent, simultaneous work to appear at AsiaCCS in October,
Jaloyan et al. [6] describe more general ROP techniques for RISC-V. We
were unable to find a preprint of the Jaloyan et al. paper as of July 1, 2020.
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2 Complexity of RISC-V ROP gadgets
RISC-V makes use of a link register, like similar RISC archi-
tectures such as PowerPC, ARM, and SPARC. In RISC-V this
is labeled the ra register. The purpose of this register is to op-
timize calls to leaf subroutines since the return address need
not be pushed or popped on the stack. The implication of this
is that in RISC ROP exploitation is mostly limited to non-leaf
function epilogues, and RISC-V ROP is no exception.
For our purposes, we define a chainable ROP gadget as
follows: an instruction sequence that:
1. Loads a value from a(sp) into ra where a is some
positive immediate value divisible by 8
2. Adds an immediate value b to sp where b > a and b is
divisible by 16 (due to stack-alignment requirements)
3. Ends in a ret (equivalent to jr ra)
In addition to the above steps needed to maintain the ROP
chain, a good ROP gadget will contain a few extra instructions
that perform useful work. Note that these requirements are
fairly restrictive, and exclude gadgets that, for example, pop
and jump to a register other than the ra register. For our pur-
poses, we will focus on gadgets that fulfill these requirements
(and thus look like function epilogues) but examining other
classes of gadgets is a promising future research direction.
2.1 A minimal ROP gadget
As an example, below is a gadget that does no work except
maintining the ROP chain. This is typically called a NOP
gadget.
0x0000000000097a68 :
c.ldsp ra, 8(sp)
c.addi sp, 0x10
c.jr ra
Note that in x86, the same three actions are performed by
a single 1-byte instruction (ret). In SPARC, a similar gadget
only requires a ret and restore to slide the register window.
In ARM, a similar gadget looks like a LDMFD followed by a
RET.
The fact that the simplest ROP gadget in RISC-V requires
more instructions than in other architectures has the following
implications:
1. When a chainable ROP gadget is found, it is very likely
that the gadget formed part of a legitimate function epi-
logue. ROP gadgets that consist entirely of unintended
instructions would be exceedingly rare.
2. The three instructions may not always be contiguous;
in other words, part of the work performed by the gad-
get may be located in between these three instructions.
When this happens, the return-oriented programmer is
unable to "trim" the work by jumping into the middle of
the work like on other architectures. Even in ARM, the
LDMFD and the RET are typically contiguous. Similarly, in
SPARC, ret and restore are almost always contiguous.
The implication of RISC-V’s departure from this norm
is that RISC-V ROP chains sometimes must account for
a larger number of undesirable gadget side effects.
Take for example the following POP gadget:
0x000000000006a5e8 :
c.ldsp ra, 0x28(sp)
c.ldsp s0, 0x20(sp)
c.ldsp a0, 0(sp)
c.ldsp a1, 8(sp)
c.ldsp s1, 0x18(sp)
c.ldsp s2, 0x10(sp)
c.addi16sp sp, 0x30
c.jr ra
If the Return-Oriented Programmer would like to use this gad-
get to pop only s2 (maybe a0 contains a runtime-calculated
value she would not like to overwrite), she is unable to do
so because jumping directly to the c.ldsp s2, 0x10(sp)
instruction would skip the load into ra, breaking the ROP
chain and causing an infinite loop.
A similar issue presents itself with ARM through LDMFD
instructions that pop a large number of registers, and with
SPARC through the restore instruction. Note however, that
in RISC-V, the instructions sandwiched between c.ldsp ra,
0x28(sp) and c.addi16sp, sp, 0x30 are often not only
pop instructions and thus can cause traps, undefined behavior,
and undesirable memory corruption.
2.2 Preconditions
The ideal way to avoid undesirable side effects is to entirely
avoid using gadgets that cause them. However this is not
always feasible, and sometimes more careful and deliberate
treatment of side effects is needed.
Take for example the following readMEM gadget:
0x00000000000d3230 :
c.ld a0, 8(a0)
c.add a0, a5
c.ldsp a4, 0x28(sp)
c.ld a5, 0(s0)
bne a4, a5, 0x1e
c.ldsp ra, 0x38(sp)
c.ldsp s0, 0x30(sp)
c.addi16sp sp, 0x40
c.jr ra
This gadget is extremely valuable because it is a very rare
readMEM gadget that reads memory pointed at by a register
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that is easily popped, incremented, and decremented through
other gadgets, and does not perform a conditional branch
depending on the read value. However, it is prone to the
following side effects:
1. The initial value of a5 is added to the read value of a0.
2. The value of a5 is read from (s0).
3. The value of a4 is popped and if the popped a4 is not
equal to the read a5 then a branch occurs.
Ideally, we want the initial value of a5 to be 0 so that the
first side effect is avoided entirely, and we want (s0) to not
trap and contain some constant known value so that we can
make the popped a4 equal to the value, avoiding the branch. If
we maintain these preconditions prior to invoking this gadget
(for example, if we found and used a pop gadget for s0, a4,
and a5), then we can prevent or account for these side effects.
It turns out that these specific preconditions can be achieved
using two other gadgets.
In terms of crafting ROP chains, we can combine the gad-
gets used to fulfill preconditions and the gadget requiring the
preconditions into a single logical unit to make programming
large ROP chains easier.
3 Self-modifying ROP
In order to mitigate the relative sparsity of side-effect-free,
clean gadgets in RISC-V ROP, we propose a trick that im-
proves the capability of these gadgets.
3.1 Saving registers
For example, one issue coming from the previous readMEM
gadget is the fact that the address in a0 was overwritten with
the value from memory. If we would like to keep the original
value for later use, we could either find a way to move the
value to some other register which is not cobbled by the read-
MEM gadget sequence, or we could write the value to some
scratch space in memory so that a later readMEM can read it
back.
We propose a technique called "self-modifying ROP" that
simplifies the second approach. A similar approach was used
in Sigreturn-Oriented Programming in x86, but our approach
goes a bit deeper and applies to "vanilla" ROP chains instead.
[1]
Rather than using a readMEM gadget to restore the value
into the register, we use a POP gadget, and the POP gadget
frame itself is the destination we write the original value to.
The closest analogue to this technique comes from SPARC
ROP, where a value is written to a future gadget’s register win-
dow in order to set the value when the window is restored.
begin
write a0
gadget sequence
that cobbles a0
pop a0
popped value
write target
Figure 1: A simple example of self-modifying ROP. Here
self-modifying ROP is used to restore the previous value of
a0 after it has been cobbled by some gadget sequence. Boxes
indicate gadget frames.
In this case, we have the option to use self-modifying ROP
rather than writing to scratch space; we avoid having to allo-
cate scratch space and make our gadget sequence more self-
contained as a benefit. As we will show later, self-modifyng
ROP is much more powerful and can also be used to circum-
vent several other limitations of gadgets.
3.2 Manufacturing a MOV gadget
One problem we ran into while evaluating RISC-V Turing
completeness was needing to write to a runtime-calculated
memory address. Since it was easiest to find arithmetic gad-
gets on a0, we wanted to find a gadget that wrote to (a0) or a
constant offset away from (a0). However, we were only able
to find nice gadgets with minimal side effects that write to
memory locations parameterized by s0, s1, a3, a4, and a few
other registers. However, we couldn’t find nice MOV gadgets
from a0 to one of these gadgets with manageable side effects.
In the case of s0 and s1, this makes sense; these registers
are designated as callee-saved registers, so any function that
modifies these registers must restore the original value by the
time it returns.
Luckily, the fact that s0 and s1 are callee-saved registers
means that POP gadgets are easily available for them. Thus,
these writeMEM gadgets can be used to write to locations
which are hardcoded into the ROP chain. Further, we can use
the same self-modifying ROP technique to write the value
of a0 to a future s0 POP gadget, in effect "manufacturing"
a MOV gadget from a0 to s0. This allows our writeMEM
gadget to write to an arbitrary calculated address.
3.3 Calling functions with arguments
In order to call libc functions from the Return-Oriented Pro-
gram, we found some POP gadgets and readMEM gadgets
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that can be used to place an arbitrary set of values into reg-
isters a0-a5. We also found a gadget that invokes jalr a5,
which sets the return address and calls the function pointed to
by a5. Using these gadgets, we can call any libc function with
up to four parameters, all of which can be calculated at run-
time using self-modifying ROP techniques. Since the found
jalr a5 gadget does not cobble a0, we can also retrieve the
return value of a libc function.
A complication arises when the function would like to
allocate stack space and write to it, corrupting the gadgets
that come before the jalr a5 gadget. This is not a problem
when the gadgets execute in a linear fashion, but when we
have loops and conditional branches (as we do), this corrup-
tion is an issue. We solve this issue in mostly the same way
as SPARC ROP, by putting the jalr a5 gadget frame im-
mediately after a "safe" buffer zone that the function call is
free to modify. We then invoke the jalr a5 gadget using an
unconditional branch.
However, there is another complication. Our unconditional
branch (part of glibc’s longjmp function) reads the next gad-
get’s ra and sp from (a0) and 0x68(a0), respectively. While
this is not usually a problem, a0 is also where the first param-
eter to a function is stored. Thus, if we were to directly branch
to the jalr a5 gadget, we would not be able to pass in an
arbitrary value as the first parameter. We can solve this by
dynamically creating a a0 POP gadget frame located before
the jalr a5 gadget frame in memory, then branching to the
a0 POP gadget instead. Note that we have to create the entire
gadget frame including the popped ra, rather than simply
write the popped value for a0 like in the previous instances
of self-modifying ROP. This is because the a0 POP gadget
frame itself is located within the "safe" zone of the function
call and thus may be overwritten.
4 Unintended instructions as a result of the C
extension
As mentioned in subsection 1.1, the C extension for RISC-
V allows some level of variable-length instructions, mean-
ing that unintended instructions are possible. For reasons ex-
plained in subsection 2.1, it is very likely that the unintended
instruction sequence will later resync with intended program
control flow to lead to a valid function epilogue. Out of 2837
gadgets we found in the version of glibc analyzed, we found
a total of 711 gadgets that start at an entry point not found in
the libc disassembly.
Looking through the starting instructions of these gadgets,
there are several that write to the zero register, several that
modify the ra register before it is popped, and several that
modify the temporary registers. We mostly ignore the tempo-
rary registers in our ROP gadgets because there are very few
POP gadgets for them since they are caller saved. We also
found lots of branches, nops, and floating point instructions.
begin
pop a5
write a0
write rest of gadget
branch
safety buffer
pop a0
popped value
jalr a5
write targets
branch target
Figure 2: An example of using self-modifying ROP to perform
a function call with an argument. Here, the value of a0 must
be restored prior to the function call since the branch gadget
cobbles a0. In addition, a safety buffer is provided so that
the called function’s own stack allocations does not overwrite
gadgets.
Some instructions that seemed useful were move, load and
store instructions that used a wide variety of registers, as well
as some instructions that moved the stack pointer (plus an
offset) to several registers including a0. The latter could be
used to perform self-modifying ROP in situations where the
location of the stack pointer is not known, by performing
arithmetic on the moved sp value and writing to the resulting
address.
Neither our example ROP gadgets nor the gadgets used in
our ROP chain generator use unintended instructions, so our
ROP chains and techniques should generalize to a RISC-V
chip without the C extension.
5 Implementing the Brainfuck instruction set
in RISC-V ROP
We demonstrate the Turing completeness of our found RISC-
V ROP gadgets by creating a tool that, given an arbitrarily
complex Brainfuck program, generates an equivalent RISC-V
ROP chain. With some simplification, the Brainfuck instruc-
tion set is implemented as follows. The actual implementation
takes care of many more preconditions/side effects, and also
performs extra arithmetic since our readMEM/writeMEM
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gadgets are usually offsetted.
• Initialization: Set a0 to point the middle of a large
buffer. This buffer will be the Brainfuck "tape". For
simplicity, we will use a cell size of 64 bits rather than
the standard 8 bits. We are free to make this modifica-
tion since the Turing completeness of Brainfuck does
not depend on integer overflow. [3] a0 will be the only
register which is preserved across instructions other than
< and >, and will represent the Brainfuck "pointer".
• The > instruction: Increment a0 8 times.
• The < instruction: Decrement a0 8 times.
• The + instruction: Write a0 to future self-modified gad-
gets. Read the value of (a0) into a0. Increment a0. Us-
ing self-modifying ROP, pop the original address stored
in a0 into s0 and write a0 to (s0). Finally, use self-
modifying ROP again to restore the original value of
a0.
• The - instruction: Identical to above.
• The . instruction: Write a0 to a future self-modified
gadget. Read the value of (a0) into a0. Call putchar.
Using self-modifying ROP, restore the original value of
a0.
• The , instruction: Write a0 to future self-modified gad-
gets. Call getchar to replace a0 with user input. Using
self-modifying ROP, pop the original address stored in
a0 into s0 and write a0 to (s0). Use self-modifying
ROP again to restore the original value of a0.
• The [ instruction: Write a0 to a self-modified a0 pop
gadget which immediately follows. (This is to restore the
value after the unconditional branch in the ] instruction.)
Write a0 to future self-modified gadgets. Dependent
on (a0) == 0, perform a conditional branch either to
the next instruction or to the instruction after the corre-
sponding ] instruction. In either case, the next gadget
being executed should restore the value of a0 through
self-modifying ROP.
• The ] instruction Write a0 to the self-modified gadget
in the implementation of the corresponding [ instruction.
Perform an unconditional branch to the corresponding [
instruction, so that it can restore the original value of a0.
• Ending Set a0 to 0 and call exit.
5.1 Compiling Brainfuck to RISC-V ROP
We introduce a compiler that compiles Brainfuck programs of
arbitrary complexity into RISC-V ROP chains using the above
mapping, written in pure JavaScript and designed to run in the
browser. An accompanying C/assembly program reads the
output of the browser tool from a file and populates memory
using the output, then begins ROP execution by moving sp to
a populated region and simulating a NOP gadget.
5.2 Results
After trying several Brainfuck programs, with the caveat that
Brainfuck programs that assume an 8-bit cell size will not
work, the vast majority of Brainfuck programs converted to
RISC-V ROP and ran easily with no issue, including an imple-
mentation of bubble sort (link), a program that prints arbitrar-
ily many square numbers (link), and a program that outputs
an ASCII-art of the Sierpinski triangle (link).
6 Conclusion and future work
We show that return-oriented programming on the RISCV64
architecture is fairly powerful, allowing for Turing-complete
code execution on gadgets found in a version of GNU libc for
Fedora Linux. We show that although difficult, it is possible to
perform arbitrary calculation and to perform actions such as
conditional branching, arithmetic, reading and writing mem-
ory, and calling libc functions with arguments. We introduce
the technique of "self-modifying ROP chains" to solve several
issues such as not having gadgets that move a value from one
register to another. In order to demonstrate the power of these
techniques, we created a compiler that converts Brainfuck
code of arbitrary complexity into RISC-V ROP chains.
In the future, we hope that more libraries for RISC-V, in-
cluding other versions of libc for other operating systems,
will be analyzed for ROP potential, and perhaps a more gen-
eral and automated approach to analyzing and chaining ROP
gadgets will make ROP attacks easier to carry out.
Availability
We make the Brainfuck-to-RISC-V-ROP compiler
available at https://garrettgu10.github.io/fuck-riscv-
rop/ and we make its full source code available at
https://github.com/garrettgu10/fuck-riscv-rop.
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